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President Clinton’s decision on Apr.8 to send Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji packing without an agreement on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization seemed to be a massive miscalculation. The President took a drubbing from much of the press, which had breathlessly reported that a deal was in the bag. The Cabinet and Whit House still appeared divided, and business leaders were characterized as furious over the lost opportunity. Zhu charged that Clinton lacked “the courage” to reach an accord. And when Clinton later telephoned the angry Zhu to pledge a renewed effort at negotiations, the gesture was widely portrayed as a flip-flop.
In fact, Clinton made the right decision in holding out for a better WTO deal. A lot more horse trading is needed before a final agreement can be reached. And without the Administration’s goal of a “bullet-proof agreement” that business lobbyists can enthusiastically sell to a Republican Congress, the whole process will end up in partisan acrimony that could harm relations with China for years.
THE HARD PART. Many business lobbyists, while disappointed that the deal was not closed, agree that better terms can still be had. And Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, National Economic Council Director Gene B. Sperling, Commerce Secretary William M. Daley, and top trade negotiator Charlene Barshefsky all advised Clinton that while the Chinese had made a remarkable number of concessions, “we’re not there yet,” according to senior officials.
Negotiating with Zhu over the remaining issues may be the easy part. Although Clinton can signal U.S. approval for China’s entry into the WTO himself, he needs Congress to grant Beijing permanent most-favored-nation status as part of a broad trade accord. And the temptation for meddling on Capital Hill may prove over-whelming. Zhu had barely landed before Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss) declared himself skeptical that China deserved entry into the WTO. And Senators Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.) and Emest F. Hollings (D-S. C.) promised to introduce a bill requiring congressional approval of any deal.
The hidden message from these three textile-state Southerners: Get more protection for the U. S. clothing industry. Hoping to smooth the way, the Administration tried, but failed, to budge Zhu on textiles. Also left in the lurch: Wall Street, Hollywood, and Detroit. Zhu refused to open up much of the lucrative Chinese securities market and insisted on “cultural” restrictions on American movies and music. He also blocked efforts to allow U. S. auto makers to provide fleet financing.
BIG JOB. Already, business lobbyists are blanketing Capitol Hill to presale any eventual agreement, but what they’ve heard so far isn’t encouraging. Republicans, including Lott, say that “the time just isn’t right” for the deal. Translation: We’re determined to make it look as if Clinton has capitulated to the Chinese and is ignoring human, religious, and labor rights violations; the theft of nuclear-weapons technology; and the sale of missile parts to America’s enemies. Beijing’s fierce critics within the Democratic Party, such as Senator Paul D. Wellstone of Minnesota and House Minority leader Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, won’t help, either.
Just how tough the lobbying job on Capitol Hill will be become clear on Apr. 20, when Rubin lectured 19chief executives on the need to discipline their Republican allies. With business and the White House still trading charges over who is responsible for the defeat of fast-track trade negotiating legislation in 1997, working together won’t be easy. And Republicans-with a wink-say that they’ll eventually embrace China’s entry into the WTO as a favor to Corporate America. Though not long before they torture Clinton. But Zhu is out on a limb, and if Congress overdoes the criticism, he may be forced by domestic critics to renege. Business must make this much dear to both its GOP allies and the Whit House: This historic deal is too important to risk losing to any more partisan squabbling.
翻譯參考：
克林頓總統關於4月8日傳送中國總理朱鎔基包裝而沒有就中國加入世界貿易組織達成協議的決定似乎是一個巨大的錯誤估計。總統從大多數新聞界的一個小夥子，他們氣喘吁吁地報告說，一個交易是在袋裡。內閣和惠特議院仍然出現分歧，商界領袖被描繪為對失去的機會感到憤怒。朱(金字旁容)基指出，克林頓沒有“勇氣”達成協議。當克林頓後來打電話給憤怒的朱，承諾在談判中重新努力，這個姿態被廣泛描繪成一個人字拖。
事實上，克林頓作出了一個正確的決定，為了更好的'世貿組織協議。在達成最終協議之前需要更多的馬交易。如果沒有政府的目標，商業遊說者可以積極地向共和黨國會出售一份“防彈協議”，整個過程將結束為多方關係，可能傷害與中國的關係多年。
硬體部分。許多商業遊說人士雖然對該交易沒有結束感到失望，但同意仍然可以有更好的條款。財政部長Robert E. Rubin，國家經濟委員會主任Gene B. Sperling，商務部長William M. Daley和頂級貿易談判代表Charlene Barshefsky都建議克林頓說，雖然中國人做出了許多讓步，“我們不是還有，“高階官員說。
與其餘的問題談判可能是容易的部分。雖然克林頓可以表示美國批准中國自己加入世貿組織，但他需要國會給予北京永久最惠國地位作為廣泛貿易協定的一部分。而在首都山的干預的誘惑可能證明是太過分了。朱先生剛剛在參議院多數黨領導人特倫特·洛特(R-Miss)宣佈自己懷疑我國應該加入世貿組織。參議員Jesse A. Helms(R-N.C。)和Emest F. Hollings(D-S.C。)答應提出一項法案，要求國會批准任何交易。
這三個紡織國家南方人的隱藏的資訊：為美國服裝行業獲得更多的保護。希望順利通過，當局試圖，但失敗，讓朱先生在紡織業。還留在徘徊：華爾街，好萊塢和底特律。朱先生拒絕開放大量有利可圖的中國證券市場，堅持對美國電影和音樂的“文化”限制。他還阻止了允許美國汽車製造商提供車隊融資的努力。
大工作。商業遊說人士已經為國會山預留任何最終協議，但他們迄今為止所聽到的並不令人鼓舞。共和黨人，包括洛特，說，“剛剛是不正確的時間”的交易。翻譯：我們決心讓它看起來好像克林頓已經向中國投降，並且忽視了人權，宗教和勞工權利的侵犯;偷竊核武器技術;並向美國的敵人出售導彈部件。北京民主黨內的激烈批評者，如明尼蘇達州的保羅·威爾斯通參議員和密蘇里州少數民族領導人理查德·Gephardt，也不會幫助。
在4月20日，Rubin向19chie的高管講述了需要管理共和黨盟友的問題時，國會山的遊說工作如何艱難。與商業和白宮仍然交易費用誰誰負責在1997年的快速貿易談判立法失敗，一起工作將不容易。和共和黨人 - 眨眼，說他們最終會擁抱中國加入WTO，作為美國公司的利益。雖然不久之前他們折磨克林頓。但是，朱鎔基在肢體上，如果國會超過批評，他可能被國內批評者強迫叛變。商業必須讓它非常珍惜它的GOP盟友和惠特議院：這個歷史性的協議太重要，不會有失去更多的黨派爭吵的風險。
